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中文摘要：
前期文献基于应计项目操控对债务契约治理效应的研究认为，国有控股公司在债务契约约束下没有显著的盈余管理行为，而非国有控股公司会做大盈余。本文同时从应计项目操控和真实活动操控两个方面考察了债务契约对公司盈余管理的影响，结果发现，公司债务水平越高，两种盈余管理程度都越高。进一步研究表明，国有控股公司负债水平对应计盈余管理无显著影响，但与真实盈余管理正相关；非国有控股公司的负债水平与应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理都显著正相关。这个研究结果是对已有研究文献的一个重要补充，同时由于真实活动盈余管理会使经济活动偏离最优决策而影响公司长远利益，因此这个发现对重新认识债务契约的治理作用具有重要意义。
英文摘要：
The paper researches the ＂debt covenant hypothesis＂ from both the accrual -based and real earnings management, it finds the following results： （ 1 ） The higher level of corporate debt, the more incentives of both the accrual - based and real earnings management; （2） Debt level of state - owned controlled company has no significant effect on accrual - based earnings management but significant positive effect on real earnings management. However, the debt level has significant effect on both the accrual - based and real earnings management in the sub - sample of non - state - owned company. This findings support the debt - covenant hypothesis from the real earnings management angle, and also show that the controller＇ characteristic will affect the choice of earnings management. It is a correction of the supplement for the literature of the view.
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