中文摘要：

以中国A股上市公司2004年—2006年间的3618个公司年度为样本,借鉴Ball和Shivakumar、Khan和Watts以及Gassen等的研究成果对财务报告稳健性进行了实证度量,研究了不同特征的最终控股股东的行为对上市公司财务报告稳健性的影响。研究发现：控股股东的掏空行为显著降低了财务报告稳健性,控股股东的扶持行为也降低了财务报告稳健性,但在统计意义上不显著;相对于非国家最终控制的上市公司,国家最终控制的上市公司的财务报告更不稳健;财务报告稳健性与最终控股股东的控制权比例呈负向变化,与其他股东的制衡能力呈同向变化。

英文摘要：

We investigate the impact of controlling shareholders＇ behavior on financial reporting conservatism.Based on a total of 3168 samples obtained from listed firms over the three-year period between 2004 and 2006,We comprehensively use the methods created by Ball and Shivakumar （2005）,Khan and Watts（2007） and Gassen et al （2006） to measure financial reporting conservatism.The empirical results indicate that the tunneling behavior significantly decreases the financial reporting conservatism,and the propping behavior also decreases the financial reporting conservatism.For state-owned listed companies,their financial reporting conservatism is lower.The proportion of control right of ultimate shareholders has a significantly negative relation with financial reporting conservatism.We also find that the check-and-balance ability of the second to the fifth largest shareholders can positively affect the conservatism of financial report.This paper provides the evidence of the effect of controlling shareholders＇ behavior on financial reporting conservatism.