中文摘要：

在原材料与回收材料可相互替代的前提下,针对原材料价格随机波动的情况研究了闭环供应链的运作过程,构建了考虑生产调整成本的非合作斯坦伯格博弈模型.以费用共担契约为主要研究内容,证明了契约变量可调整的再制造供应链效率高于固定参数的供应链,继而以制造商、回收商的可调整契约期望利润为优化依据,设计了随着原材料价格波动,回收批发价、费用分担比例可调整的费用共担型再制造闭环供应链契约协调机制.最后证明了契约的有效性并给出了算例分析.分析结果表明：原材料价格随机波动幅度越大,可调整的费用共担契约的改善程度越高,并能实现供应链中利润和费用的合理分配.

英文摘要：

Aiming at the stochastic price of raw materials,the closed-loop supply chain（CLSC） operation mechanism is analyzed on the premise of mutually substituted raw and recovered materials.With the expense-sharing contract as the object of the study,a non-cooperative stackelberg game considering production adjustment cost is built,and the fact is proved that the CLSC with adjustable contract variables is more efficient than that with fixed ones.Following the price of raw materials,a recycling price and sharing proportion adjustable expense-sharing contract of remanufacturing CLSC is designed,and the optimal parameters including the expected profit of the manufacturer and the recycler.The effectiveness of the contract is proved and the numerical analysis is provided lastly.It is found that the wider the fluctuating range of raw materials＇ price,the more efficient the contract work.