中文摘要：

笔者深入研究了银行是否会对不同实际控制人性质的公司存在信贷歧视现象以及这种信贷歧视在不同政府干预程度下的差异。研究表明：由于政府与国有公司的利益紧密相连，国有公司能够更便利地从银行获取信贷资源，相对非国有公司具有较高的负债水平。与政府干预程度较大的地区相比，在政府干预程度较低的地区，政府干预银行信贷决策的动机相对较弱，国有与非国有公司在负债水平上的差异相对较小。研究结果不仅丰富了国内外学者关于公司负债的经验研究，而且有助于深入理解我国公司负债水平不合理的

英文摘要：

This paper examines the bank-lending discrimination between firms with different nature of real controller and the differences under different intervention extent. Results show： state owned firms can obtain credit resources more easily, so they have higher debt level. Relative to regions with larger government intervention, regions with lower government intervention, the government has lower motivation to intervene bank credit policies, so the differences of debt levels would be relatively small. This paper not only enriches the related studies on corporate liability, but also helps us deeply understand the institutional roots of the irrational corporate liability.