中文摘要：

以2004-2008年我国上市公司为研究对象，从终极控制人的视角实证检验了终极控制股东特征对公司资本结构的影响。研究表明，负债融资扩大了终极控制股东可控制的资源，便利了其攫取行为，且不会导致控制权的稀释，终极控制股东两权分离程度与资本结构显著正相关。较高的现金流权能够有效制约终极控制股东通过扩大负债融资获取私有收益的行为，终极控制股东现金流权对其两权分离程度与资本结构间的关系具有显著的调节作用。与非国有控制公司相比，国有终极控制股东通过扩大负债融资获取私有收益的动机相对较弱，其两权分离程度对资本结构的正向影响也相对较小。

英文摘要：

Using a corporate-level dataset of Chinese private listed companies over the period of 2004-2008, this paper examines how ultimate controlling shareholder influence corporate capital structure. The results show that： debt financing expand the ultimate shareholder＇s control of the resources which facilitate the expropriation behaviors, and will not lead to dilution of controlling rights, the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights positively related to capital structure significantly. High cash flow rights can effectively restrain the ultimate shareholder＇s behaviors of expanding debt financing to gain private benefits. The ultimate shareholder＇s cash flow right has a significantly moderate effect on the relationship between the divergence and capital structure. Relative to non-state owned firms, state ultimate shareholders＇ motivation of expanding debt financing to pursue private benefits is relatively weak, and the positive impact of the divergence between state controlled shareholders＇ controlling rights and cash flow rights on capital structure is also relatively small.