中文摘要：

现代大城市交通愈发拥堵和智能交通系统广泛应用背景下，拥堵收费、智能诱导和主从博弈、随机均衡分别是重要的管理手段和客观现象．考虑对交通网络中各路段实施收费策略，利用随机用户均衡（SUE）交通流模式研究了效率损失的上界，该交通流模式是由一部分受控于Stackelberg策略的用户所诱导产生的．假设路段时间函数是可分离的单调增的凸函数，并固定交通网络起讫点（OD）需求，在建立Logit-SUE的等价变分不等式（VI）的基础上推导出SUE和Stackelberg策略条件下交通网络的效率损失表达式．这对城市交通管理的系统决策具有重要参考价值．

英文摘要：

Under the circumstances of increasing traffic congestion and widely adopted intel- ligent transportation system in big cities; congestion pricing and intelligent guidance, leader- follower game and stochastic equilibrium, are important management means and objective phenomena respectively. Considering tax schemes imposed on each link, upper bounds of inef- ficiency are investigated using stochastic user equilibrium （SUE） flow pattern that is induced by a crowd of Stackelberg strategy controlled users. With the assumption of separability, increase, and convexity of link time function and fixed origin-destination （OD） demands of traffic network, the equivalent variational inequality （VI） for a Logit-based SUE model is firstly established and further used to obtain upper bounds on inefficiency of traffic network under condition of SUE and Stackelberg strategy. This research provides referring significance for systematical decision-making of urban trahsportation management