中文摘要：

从控股股东掏空行为的视角,采用中国上市公司的贷款数据分析中国的商业银行对企业的监督作用。研究发现,银行对控股股东的掏空行为具有一定的监督作用,在银行贷款数量多、贷款期限长的公司中,控股股东的掏空行为明显减少。对不同所有制的企业,银行的监督作用存在异质性。目前,银行的监督作用主要体现在国有银行中,而国有银行能有效监督的对象仅限于地方政府和私人控制的企业,国有银行对中央企业的监督能力较弱。从事后监督来看,银行会对控股股东的掏空行为做出贷款政策的调整,对于控股股东掏空严重的企业,续新贷款的银行数量、续新贷款比例显著下降,而且贷款利率显著提高。

英文摘要：

Using the loan data of China listed companies,this paper studies the bank＇s supervision function from the perspective of controlling shareholder＇s tunneling activities.We find that companies,which have more bank loans or longer loan terms,have significant less tunneling behavior.This finding demonstrates that Chinese commercial banks can play a supervisory role.And banks have different levels of supervising ability in different types of enterprises.We also find that the supervisory role function mainly exists in the state-owned banks,whose effective monitoring objects are enterprises controlled by local government or private enterprises.From the ex-post monitoring perspective,the bank will make adjustments of loan policy towards the controlling shareholder＇s tunneling behavior.For firms with more controlling shareholder＇s tunneling activities,the number of banks renegotiated loans with firm and the loan renegotiation ratio both decrease while the interest rates of renegotiated loans increases significantly.