集中居住往往被认为是在中国人地关系高度紧张的基本国情下既不影响粮食安全又能为工业化供给土地的一种有效途径,由此,集中居住工程便在农村地区大规模地展开。然而。随着社会主义新农村建设的提出。地方政府实施集中居住的动力机制已经发生了较大变化。为了进一步认识这些变化以及寻求解决集中居住过程中拆迁补偿困境的方法,本文基于江苏省丹阳市新桥镇的实地调查。研究了农村集中居住的发生机制、发展阶段以及拆迁补偿等问题。研究结果表明工业化是目前集中居住的主要动力。但并不是唯一动力.农村公共设施供给效率和公共建设项目的推进等因素开始成为集中居住的诱发和推动力量,并且其作用程度逐渐加强。伴随着集中居住的不断推进,集中居住的具体模式及特征也开始发生变化。主要包括:上级政府对集中居住干预力量加大;发生在工业扩张之前的集中居住所占比重越来越高;土地集约程度逐渐提升;集中居住区建设投入逐步加大。最后本文对如何化解拆迁困境提出了政策建议。
Centralizing inhabitation project has been carried out in many villages in China, because it usually is considered as a effective way to supply land for industrialization without affecting grain security at the context of highly insufficient land in China, relative to its huge population. However, with the developing of the project of new socialism countryside construction, the dynamics of centralizing inhabitation have changed a lot. To recognize those changes and to resolve to the "dilemma of removing", based on a case from Xinqiao Town of Danyang City in Jiangsu Province, this paper studies three important issues, which are occurrence mechanism, developing stage and compensation for removing, in the progress of centralizing inhabitation in rural China. The results show that the industrialization is the main driving force of centralizing inhabitation , but not the only one. Some other factors, e.g. supplying efficiency of rural public facilities and construction projects, begin to be another stronger diving force of centralizing inhabitation. With the progressing of centralizing inhabitation, its models and characteristics have changed. Those changes include: the intervention of government at higher level become stronger; more cases of centralizing inhabitation take place before industrial expanding; the pressure to land consolidation are getting stronger; there are more and more inputs for community construction at centralizing inhabitation area. At last, this paper suggests some policies to resolve the "dilemma of removing".