随着中国宏观经济进入"新常态"以及房地产市场的转型调整,地方政府土地财政亟待转型,厘清土地财政的动机是关键。本文首先从分税制改革、土地供应制度、政绩考核机制等维度探讨土地财政背后的制度环境并估算出地方政府的土地财政规模;接着采用2003-2012年中国省级面板数据,从地方政府"财政压力"和"政绩考核"内外因两个方面检验土地财政的动机,发现地方政府受"政绩考核"的激励要远大于自身的"财政压力"。
With China's macroeconomy entering the state of "New Normal"and the restructuring adjustment of the real estate market,the land financing of local governments is in urgent need of restructuring. This paper firstly estimates the size of land finance of local governments and explores the institutional environment for land financing from the dimensions of tax reform,land supply system,government performance evaluation mechanism,etc.,and then uses China's provincial-level panel data in 2003- 2012 to test both internal and external incentives of land finance( i. e., " the financial pressure" and " the performance evaluation" of local governments). The findings show that local governments are more motivated by"performance evaluation"than by their own " financial pressure".