中文摘要：

企业常常面临选择：零部件生产是自己制造还是外包给零部件供应商,在产业组织理论中是一个企业纵向一体化的选择问题。在分析指出下游企业零部件生产的外包和自制的市场行为改变了该产业组织的结构的基础上,本文分别以上游供应商利润、下游企业利润和消费者剩余为优化目标,研究上游供应商的产品定价、下游企业零部件生产的外包和自制决策,将cournot博弈嵌套到Stackelberg博弈中,建立该产业组织的复合博弈模型,得到了该产业组织在不同结构下的不同均衡,即相关企业的最优生产经营决策。对于上游供应商,下游企业零部件生产的外包比自制总是可以获得较高的利润,并且两者的差距随着市场容量的增加而增大,对于下游企业,其零部件自制获得的利润总是高于外包获得的利润,其竞争的下游企业的利润则也是与之同方向变化。这些结果可供供应链的企业在竞争环境下制定最优市场策略时参考,尤其是可供企业在零部件外包或自制决策时参考。

英文摘要：

Firms commonly confront the choice of making components themselves or outsourcing them to suppliers,which is known as choice problem of a firm＇s vertical integration in industrial organization theory.Taking the profits of upper suppliers and downstream enterprises and the consumer surplus as optimization targets respectively,this paper studies upstream suppliers product pricing,parts＇ Make-or-Buy of downstream enterprises on the basis of pointing out that downstream firms＇ Make-or-Buy market behavior changed organizational structure of the industry.This paper nests the Cournot game into the Stackelberg game and establishes complex game model of the industrial organization,obtains different equalibriums in the different structures of this industrial organization,which are the best producing and management decisions to related corporations.For the upstream suppliers,downstream companies outsourcing parts production always can make higher profits,and the gap between the two increases with the market capacity increasing.For the downstream enterprises,the profit from making in-house is always higher than the profit from parts outsourcing,and the profit of enterprises in competition is also changing,accompany with market capacity in the same direction.These results provide effective reference for supply chain enterprises in competitive environment to institute the optimal marketing strategy,especially for companies to constitute Make-or-Buy decision.