中文摘要：

本文以2013年12月31日之前所有风险资本支持的以IPO方式在沪、深交易所成功退出的433个项目为研究样本,基于投资项目视角实证检验了主导VC机构的联合投资策略对其退出时投资绩效的影响以及影响机理。研究发现,就联合投资策略与投资绩效的关系而言,主导VC机构的联合投资策略对其退出时的投资绩效具有显著的负向影响。关于联合投资策略对投资绩效的作用机理,一方面联合投资策略对投资绩效的不利影响不仅来源于联合投资模式事前＂选择＂项目时的劣势地位,而且与联合投资模式的事后＂价值增加功能＂失效有关;另一方面,风险投资行业市场竞争状况会对主导VC机构的联合投资策略与其项目层面投资绩效之间的关系产生影响,当风险投资行业市场竞争激烈时,主导VC机构的联合投资策略对投资绩效的负向影响更显著。

英文摘要：

Since existing literature suggests taking syndication investment strategies can help leading venture capital firms （referred to as leading VCs） to deal with the investment uncertainty, do these syndication investment strategies have some impact on the investment performance of leading VCs？ If so, how？ Based on the data of 433 successful VC projects which have exited through IPO in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange before December 31, 2013, we explore the impact and mechanism of syndication investment strategies on the investment performance of leading VCs from the perspective of investment projects to answer these questions. The results show that, for the relations between syndication investment strategies and investment performance, syndication investment strategies of leading VCs have significantly negative effects on their investment performance. For the mechanism of syndication investment strategies on VC investment performance, first, the adverse impacts of syndication investment strategies stem not only from the ＂selection＂ disadvantage before investment, but also from the ＂value-addition＂ malfunction afterwards. Second, the venture capital industry market competition can influence the relationship between the leading VC syndication investment strategies and investment performance. When the venture capital industry market competition is intensive, syndication investment strategies of leading VCs have more pronounced negative effects on the investment performance.