中文摘要：

本文利用我国强制要求会计师事务所组织形式转制这一契机,以2009-2012年沪深两市A股上市公司为对象,考察了在有限责任制和特殊普通合伙制这两种组织形式下,外部审计对上市公司过度投资行为的治理效应的差异。结果发现,与有限责任制相比,会计师事务所采用特殊普通合伙制能显著加强其对上市公司客户过度投资行为的约束,但上述结论仅存在于法治水平较高地区的上市公司中。此外,只有在国有企业直接控制的上市公司中,事务所组织形式对公司过度投资行为才有显著影响。以上研究结论,有助于理解不同制度环境下,事务所组织形式对外部审计的公司治理作用的影响。

英文摘要：

Based on Chinese mandatory change of auditors＇ organizational form and using a sample of A-share listed firms on Chinese security market during 2009-2012, we investigate the corporate governance effect of external auditors under differ- ent organizational forms. The results show that accounting firms under Special Partnership （SP）, compared to those under Lim- ited Liability Company （ LLC）, are more able to reduce their listed clients＇ over-investment, but this effect is only significant in listed firms located in good legal environment or listed finns whose direct controlling shareholders are state-owned firms. Our study throws light on the effect of auditor＇s organizational form on corporate governance under different institutional environ- ment.