中文摘要：

产业共性技术研发符合供给侧改革对调结构、促转型的目标要求,但企业在共性技术研发中面临组织和市场的“双重失灵”.鉴于此,构建了政府和企业对产业共性技术研发的投资博弈模型,根据模型纳什均衡解的不同情况,分别研究了中央和地方两种类型政府资助龙头企业或一般企业时二者的最优投资策略组合,并通过案例分析获取了模型变量的经济数据和模型参数的回归值,证明了模型的可操作性.研究结果显示,中央和地方政府在产业共性技术研发供给体系中角色不同,中央政府发挥主导作用,地方政府扮演跟随者和补充投资者的角色.研究成果为政府根据资助企业特点采取权变的投资策略、企业根据政府特点采取合理的项目申报和投资策略提供了理论依据.

英文摘要：

Industrial generic technology R＆D meets the requirements of supply side reform, whose destinations are mainly structure adjustment and economic transformation. However, enterprises encounter ＂double failure＂ of organiza- tion and market. Therefore, it established an investment game model between government and enterprises. It studied the optima] investment strategy combination between central, local governments and leading, general enterprises under different circumstances of the Nash equilibrium. It also verified the operability of the model through obtaining economic data of model variables and model parameters.~ The results show that central and local governments play different roles in the industrial generic technology R＆D supply system. The central government plays a leading role, and the local governments play the role of following and supplementing investors. It also provides theoretical basis for two situations, which are government should take contingent investment strategies according to different enterprise characteristics, and enterprises should take reasonable project reporting and investment strategies according to different government characteristics.