中文摘要：

基于产业共性技术研发在新形势下经济转型升级中的战略意义以及共性技术研发投资的“死亡谷”效应,构建了政府和企业两个投资主体、预研投资和研发投资两种投资类型的柯布道格拉斯生产函数（CD生产函数）投资博弈模型。通过最优反应函数求解,得到不同政府预算占比情况下共性技术研发投资的纳什均衡,探索了政府和企业对两种投资的最优比例,并通过案例分析验证了模型的有效性。结果发现,政府在产业共性技术投资供给中更倾向于预研投资,企业在产业共性技术投资供给中更倾向于研发投资;政府应根据产业发展不同阶段,适时调整功能定位,针对产业共性技术研发投资,动态调整支持方式和支持力度。

英文摘要：

Given the s trategic significance of Indus tr ial Generic Technology R ＆ D in the new situation of economic trans -formation and upgrading and the ＂Dead Valley＂ effect of Industrial Generic Technology R＆D Investment, this paper es-tablished a Cobb-Douglas production function Investment Game Model of two types of investment between the government and enterprises. This paper obtained the Nash equilibrium of Generic Technology R＆D investment under different cir-cumstances of government budget proportion throug h solving th e optimal response function. This paper also explored the optimal proportion of two types of investment between government and enterprises and verified the validity of the model through a case study. The study found that government investment in Industrial Generic Technology R ＆？ D should be more inclined to supply pre-research investment while enterprises investment should be more inclined to supply R＆D in-vestment. Meanwhile,the government should adjust its positioning and function according to the different stages of indus-trial development and take dynamic measures of different supporting ways and intensity to invest in Industrial Generic Technology R ＆ D.