中文摘要：

主要研究水平竞争（相同航线的竞争）下的座位控制问题。证明了纳什均衡的存在性，且对竞争条件下各票价等级可获得的座位总数与无竞争条件下的座位总数进行了比较。分析结果表明：水平竞争下竞争性订票限额与垄断者订票限额之间的大小取决于溢出乘客（被一家公司拒绝而转移到另一家公司的乘客）所属的需求类型。

英文摘要：

Seat inventory control problem under horizontal competition （two airlines compete for passengers on the same flight leg） was studied. It is proved that there are uniqueness conditions of Nash equilibrium. The total numbers of seats available in each fare class with and without competition were compared. The results demonstrate that under horizontal competition the booking limits depend upon the overflow passengers＇ type.