中文摘要：

较低的透明度使商业银行面临严重的代理冲突，并使其承担过度信用风险。给银行经理设计随机收益合约能缓解道德风险。但金融管制抑制了银行经理报酬一绩效敏感性。解除规制增加投资机会，但风险也随之而来。要降低银行自由化过程中的信用风险，需要建立股票等长期激励合约，使经理获得风险回报而不是寻求信息租金。2005年以来，中国银行业经理报酬出现了显著的松绑现象。但仍以合约收益为主，长期看，中国银行业需要建立基于长期绩效的经理报酬体系。

英文摘要：

The commercial banks are encountering serious agency problems because of the low transparence. Therefore, the banks take on excessive risk. To rebate the moral risk, it is necessary for the bank to device a compatibility incentive mechanism. However, the financial regulation decreases the Pay-Performance Sensitivity. Deregulation can increase the opportunity of investment while risk also follows. In order to resolve the risk and improve the performance of banks, the bank should use stock-based pay and stock option to motivate managers which can make managers obtain the return of risk not the rent of information . In China , the compensation of bank manager increase strikingly just as what the effect of deregulation predict from 2005. However, the compensation is based on contract earning mainly. Therefore, banks should construct an incentive system based on long-terms performance.