中文摘要：

随着我国城镇化进程的加快,污染型邻避设施的规划建设引起的群体性事件日益增多,给政府的公共政策管理带来一定的困扰,建立一套完整的公众参与制度无疑是解决邻避冲突的重要途径之一。基于公众参与行为主体的视角出发,采用演化博弈理论构建了公众与投资企业的演化博弈模型,分析了公众与投资企业的演化稳定性,以最优策略（公众参与和投资企业考虑公众利益诉求）为假设条件,重点讨论了四种情形下博弈双方策略的演变形态。最后,根据博弈结果从引导公众积极参与和引导投资企业积极考虑公众利益诉求两个方面提出相关政策建议,以期为污染型邻避设施公众参与制度设计提供一定的参考借鉴。

英文摘要：

With the accelerated process of urbanization in China, planning and construction of polluting NIMBY facilities caused mass incidents increasing, which bring some troubles to the government＇s public policy management. Establishing a complete system of public participation is undoubtedly one important way to solve the conflict of NIMBY. Based on the perspective of public participation behavior, this paper constructs the evolutionary game model of the public and the investment enterprises by the evolutionary game theory,analysis of the evolutionary stability of public and investment enterprises, with the optimal strategy （ public participation and investment enterprises to consider the public interest demand） for the assumptions, discussing the evolvement form of the game both sides strategy under four cases. Finally, According to game results, this paper propose relevant policy recommendations from guiding the public to actively participate and guiding investment enterprises to actively invest into account the public interest demands, in order to provide some references for the design of the public participation mechanism of polluting NIMBY facilities.