中文摘要：

为抑制近年来工程领域普遍存在的招投标串标、围标现象,运用前景理论建立不完全信息有限理性假设下串标、围标前景模型,求解串标、围标共谋与防共谋解析解,研究结果揭示了串标、围标共谋与防共谋的影响因素,认为可以通过加大经济惩罚强度和名誉惩罚强度、降低共谋收益和监管成本、增强威慑性、提高监管效率等措施来减少共谋者参与共谋的可能性,增加业主实施监管的可能性,实现有效遏制招投标串标、围标的目的。

英文摘要：

To curb the current common contacting bidding and together-conspired bidding in the field of engineering, the prospect models of contacting bidding and together-conspired bidding under incomplete information and bounded rationality hypothesis are proposed based on prospect theory. The analytical solutions to contacting bidding and together-conspired bidding coalition and coalition-proof is obtained. The research results reveal the influencing factors of contacting bidding and together-conspired bidding coalition and coalition-proof. We think that by increasing economic and reputational punishment strength, reducing coalition benefits and regulatory cost, enhancing deterrent and improving the regulation efficiency, we can reduce the likelihood of the conspirators in coalition and increase the likelihood of the owners＇ regula- tion. The goal for curbing contacting bidding and together-conspired bidding effectively can also be achived.