中文摘要：

目前,我国的市场监管体制分为两种,或者由中央政府垂直管理,或者由地方政府属地管理。本文建立了一个博弈模型,从监管部门事中监管的视角,对垂直管理体制和属地管理体制的监管绩效进行了比较分析。本文发现：在两种体制下监管努力的相对大小是不确定的,不过垂直管理体制会激励更多的企业依法生产,而在属地管理体制下的税收总量较大,经济增长速度较快。本文的研究在改革完善市场监管体制以及缓解各类安全与污染等问题上具有相关的政策含义。

英文摘要：

An administrative department for market supervision is either vertically managed by the central government or managed by the jurisdictional government.This paper builds a theoretical model to have a comparative analysis on performance of the vertical management and the jurisdictional management from the perspective of supervision in the process.We find that which system＇s supervision efforts are greater is uncertain,but vertical management can encourage more firms to choose a good mode of production than jurisdictional management.In addition,jurisdictional management can help to get a larger tax amount and a higher economic growth rate than vertical management.This paper has some useful policy suggestions to the reform of administrative management and alleviating environment and safety accidents.