中文摘要：

规章制度（官僚政策）在社会生活中扮演了重要的角色,理论上需要解释其存在的理由。在一个委托人-监督者-代理人（PSA）的框架下分析了监督者与代理人的合谋问题,研究发现,很多官僚政策通过客观指标筛选代理人以限制监督者的权力,可以防范和减轻合谋带来的损失,提高委托人的收益。进而讨论了最优官僚政策的特征,并通过两个具体的例子,分别说明现实中＂单边约束＂和＂双边约束＂的最优官僚政策是如何决定的。最后指出官僚政策可能存在的一些局限性。

英文摘要：

There is a theoretical question why there are so many bureaucratic policies in our lives.In aprincipal-supervisor-agent framework（PSA）,we study the collusion problem between the supervisor and the agent.We find that,many bureaucratic policies can limit the supervisor power by screening agents,and can be more helpful to collusion proof,reduce the losses caused by collusion and improve the revenue of principal.Then we analyze the characteristics of optimal bureaucratic policies and show how to determine the optimal bureaucratic policies by two examples.Finally,we point out the potential shortcomings of the bureaucratic policies.