中文摘要：

本文研究了在供应商既通过零售商，也通过直销渠道销售产品的双渠道供应链中的价格和广告策略。在一个无限期连续动态博弈模型中，每一期，供应商先制定自己的批发价格、直销价格和广告投入的决策；零售商随后选择零售价格和零售渠道的广告投入。通过模型求解，我们发现，（1）价格对广告的依赖关系取决于二者的广告是竞争性的还是互补性的。（2）当供应商的广告对零售商的需求是起补充作用时，零售商可能有搭顺车的行为。（3）由于供应商有两个销售渠道，即便零售商的广告对直销渠道的需求是竞争性的，在一定情况下，零售商增加广告投入仍然可能使得供应商受益。

英文摘要：

In this paper,we study the pricing and advertising decisions in a supply chain where the manufacturer sells through a retailer and its own direct channel. In a differential game,in each period the manufacturer decides its wholesale price, direct price and advertising expenses. The retailer then chooses the retail channel＇s price and advertising expenditure. We find that, （1） the relationship between prices and advertising depends on whether the firms＇ advertising activities are competitive or complementary. （2） When the effect of manufacturer＇s advertising on the retailer＇s sales is complementary, the retailer may free ride on the manufacturer＇s advertising activities. （3） In a dual-channel, even if the effect of retailer＇s advertising on the direct channel sales is competitive, under certain circumstances the manufacturer may still benefit from the retailer＇s increased advertising budget.