中文摘要：

基于代理理论和决策有限理性假说,理论分析了财务冗余对企业创新效率的影响以及股权制衡对该影响的治理作用,并以A股上市高新技术企业为研究样本,利用随机前沿模型进行实证检验.研究结果表明：财务冗余对创新效率有一定的负面影响;股权制衡作为重要的公司治理机制,显著抑制了财务冗余对创新效率的负面影响.进一步研究发现,当企业面临较少的投资机会和较低的市场竞争时,股权制衡能够显著抑制财务冗余对创新效率的负面影响,这说明股权制衡的治理与外部环境的影响在创新管理过程中具有替代作用.

英文摘要：

Based on the agency theory and the limited rational hypothesis, it provided theoretical analysis on the effect of financial slack on the innovation efficiency and the governance effect of balance of ownership structure. Using sto- chastic frontier model, it conducted an empirical test with the sample of Chinese listed high-tech enterprises. The results show that： financial slack has negative effect on innovation efficiency; as an important corporate governance mechanism, balance of ownership structure significantly inhibits the negative impact of financial slack on innovation efficiency. Further analysis shows that balance of ownership structure plays a positive governance role on innovation efficiency when high-tech enterprise is faced with less investment opportunity and lower level of market competition, giving a proof of substitution effect between governance effect of balance of ownership structure and external environment during the process of innovation management.