中文摘要：

本文基于高管外部薪酬差距和高管一员工薪酬差距发挥作用途径和机理的差异，利用2010年到2015年上市高新技术企业数据，分析高管外部薪酬差距对高新技术企业创新投资的影响，以及高管一员工薪酬差距对高新技术企业创新效率的影响，研究发现：（1）高管外部薪酬差距的增大能够激励企业增加创新投资，且高管一员工薪酬差距的增大会降低企业创新效率；（2）企业生命周期对内外部薪酬差距影响企业创新具有调节作用，处于成长期的企业高管外部薪酬差距的增大更能够激励企业增加创新投资，而高管一员工薪酬差距带来的企业创新效率损失较低；（3）进一步区分市场竞争环境差异的研究结果表明，市场竞争程度的提高能够加强高管外部薪酬差距对企业创新投资的促进作用，对成长期企业这一促进作用尤其明显；无论企业处于生命周期的哪个阶段，市场竞争程度的提高均能抑制高管一员工薪酬差距对企业创新效率的负面影响。

英文摘要：

Based on different work ways and mechanism of executives outside pay gap and execu- tives-employee compensation gaps, this paper analyzed the effect of executives outside pay gap to the high-tech enterprise innovation investment, and executives-employee compensation gap to the high-tech enterprise innovation investment efficiency using data from 2010 to 2015 listed high- tech enterprises. Study found that： （ 1 ） Executives outside pay gap would encourage enterprises to increase innovation investment, and executives-employee compensation gap would reduce the enterprise innovation efficiency; （2） The life cycle play adjusting role： In the growth of enterprise executives outside pay gap was able to encourage enterprises to increase more innovation invest- ment, and executives-employee salary gap lead to enterprise innovation lower efficiency Ioss~ （3） Further distinguish market competition environment difference, results showed that the in- crease of the degree of competition could strengthen the executives outside pay gap for the pro- motion of enterprise innovation investment, and the growth enterprise the promoting effect was more obvious; In any stage of life cycle, the increase of the degree of competition were able to restrain the negative effect on the efficiency of enterprise innovation by executive-employee com- pensation gap.