中文摘要：

在非对称情形下,考虑具有技术不确定和未来收益不确定的竞争研究与开发（R＆D）项目的不可逆策略性投资.利用期权博弈理论和随机优化方法给出了高效研发公司（主导者）的最优投资阈值和最优投资规则的解析表达式,并证明了由于两公司的竞争使投资阈值下降.其次讨论了两公司的混合投资策略,并给出每个公司执行投资期权的概率和两公司同时执行投资期权的概率.在最后给出了数值模拟算例来说明该文结论的合理性.

英文摘要：

In asymmetrical case, the paper considers irreversible strategic investment in competing research and development （R＆D） projects with technological uncertainty and uncertainty of future returns. Using real option game theory and stochastic optimal control approach, this paper presents the optimal investment threshold values and the optimal investment rule of hight-efficient firm （leader）, and showed that the investment threshold values are reduced by competition of two firms. The mixed investment strategy for two firms is discussed and gives the probability for each firm exercise the option to invest, also presents the probability of simultaneous exercise of the option to invest for two firms in the paper. Finally, it uses an example from innovation case to show that this paper＇s results are reasonable.