中文摘要：

本文基于中国上市公司经理激励契约安排的制度背景,把经理激励契约纳入投资者非理性分析框架,就投资者情绪与经理激励契约如何相互作用影响企业投资进行了理论分析,并进行了实证检验。结果发现,高管持股会诱发高管利用投机的股市进行过度投资,而与股价弱相关的货币薪酬没有这种作用,而且经理薪酬的这种作用因企业实际控制人性质不同而有所差异。本研究表明高管持股在企业投资决策中具有负面的公司治理效应。

英文摘要：

Based on the differences in arranging China listed firms＇ executive compensation, a model is proposed to analyze the relationships among capital market imperfections, executive compensation and corporate investment. It is resulted that the corporate investment is negatively correlated with the investor＇s sentiment. The reward contract sensitive to stock price can ease the driving of investor＇s sentiment towards the corporation＇s investment behavior, whereas those contracts which have weak relation with stock price don＇t have the same effects.