中文摘要：

本文基于博弈论和信息经济学,分析了政府与企业之间的监管博弈,构建了监管决策者、监管执行者和信息生产者之间双重委托-代理模型。通过博弈模型的求解,发现社会公众的心理倾向是决定监管参与者收益的关键因素,信息生产者最优努力水平与政府惩处力度并不直接相关,但监管执行者的努力和收益都与决策者对其激励水平紧密联系。监管决策者越是风险规避,自身收益越小,对监管执行者的激励力度会越强。

英文摘要：

Based on game theory and information economics, this paper constitutes a double principal-a- gent model to describe the game relations among the central government, the governmental departments, and the Internet corporations as three game players in China＇ s Internet regulation. The public opinion towards Internet regulation is the key factor to the revenue of the three players. The optimal effort level of Internet corporations does not depend on the incentive by the government departments directly, however, the effort and revenue level of the departments relates close to the incentive by the central government. The more likely the central government is risk aversion, the less revenue it will get and the more incentive it will exert to the departments,