中文摘要：

中国土地执法实践呈现“摇摆现象”，即有时执法有效，有时执法失灵。执法摇摆现象的发生，并非完全因为法律不完备或者土地执法部门能力有限，还在于中国集中体制下的“嵌入式执法”。在中国国家体系中，土地执法部门被嵌入在集中体制及其建构的中心工作中。在中心工作完成过程中，土地执法部门真正完成的并非其职能目标，而是集中体制目标。不同中心工作的建构，导致土地执法效果可能有效也可能失灵，呈现出摇摆不定的执法效果。集中体制本身的分化，即中央和各级地方政府目标重点的不同，也使得土地执法效果更不可预期。

英文摘要：

In China, the practice of law enforcement agencies of land has presented a phenomenon of swing, in which sometimes law enforcement leads to effective result, sometimes results in failure. The swing-type enforcement cannot be entirely attributed to the incompleteness of law or the limited capacity of law enforcement agencies as most studies have argued, but also is due to the embedded law enforcement under the centralized political and administrative system. Embedded law enforcement means that, law enforcement agencies of land have been embedded in the centralized political and administrative system, along with the central tasks constructed by the centralized system. According to the request of the centralized political and administrative system, all the law enforcement agencies must help to finish the central tasks. Thus it produces goal displacement, in which the goals of law enforcement agencies are set behind, whereas the centralized system＇ s general goals are to be completed instead. On the other hand, to realize the goals with dif- ferent nature rapidly, the central tasks must be accomplished by the mechanism of movement, which will still induce a swing effect of the law enforcement on land. Also, the differentiation of the central- ized system itself, which means the local government focuses on different goals comparing to the cen- tral government, will further deepen the unpredictability of the effect of law enforcement on land. The notion of embedded law enforcement can integrate organically the construct constraint in state＇ s macro-level and the practical operation in local＇ s micro-level, show vividly the conflicts and selections of different logic in the course of enforcement, thus explain series of contradictory phenomena in the same framework.