中文摘要：

本文以中国制造业上市公司为研究样本，实证检验公司CEO管理者权力（任职期限、所有权权力、两职兼任）对公司研发投入的作用，而后进一步基于交互效应模型，研究任职期限、所有权权力、两职兼任之间可能存在的交互效应，深入解析CEO管理者权力对企业创新投资行为的作用机制。研究结果表明，（1）CEO兼任董事长有助于公司增加创新投资，CEO所有权权力越大，公司的创新研发投入越多,提升管理者权力是促进CEO进行创新研发投入的重要因素；（2）CEO两职兼任与所有权权力之间存在显著的交互效应，CEO组织权力（两职兼任）与所有权权力两者之间没有表现为互相强化，而是会互相弱化对公司创新投资的作用。

英文摘要：

With China＇s listed A-share manufacturing companies as samples, this paper empirically examines the effect of the CEO＇s managerial power （duality of CEO and chairman of the board, ownership rights, tenure） on corporate R＆D investment; furthermore, this paper explores the possible interaction effect among duality of CEO and chairman of the board, ownership rights, tenure. According to the above research, we find that （1） duality of CEO and chairman of the board and ownership rights arc positively related with R＆D investment. （2）there is interaction effect between duality of CEO and chairman of the board and ownership rights. They weaken each other＇ s effect on R＆D investment.