中文摘要：

不同的所有权性质以及潜藏在其下的微观治理机制对公司创新存在何种影响？围绕这一重要却未得到深入研究的理论和实践问题，本文根据中国上市公司数据，首先，区分不同类型的所有权性质研究发现，中国民营企业，主要是终极控股股东为家族或自然人的上市公司更愿意进行持续高水平的研发投入；而中国国有企业，主要是终极控股股东为中央政府和国家部委、地方政府和其所属机构（政府控股）的上市公司创新投资较低。其次，基于终极控制权理论，从第二类代理问题与大股东制衡的视角发现，虽然终极控股股东两权偏离在一定程度上有损于公司创新，但是家族或自然人控股的上市公司的其他大股东制衡有助于提高研发与创新投入，即其大股东制衡机制优于国有企业；而政府控股的上市公司其他大股东不仅无力推动公司创新，而且甚至显著降低研发投入水平。

英文摘要：

How different ownership properties and the potential micro - governance mechanisms influence and corporate innovation？ In order to answer this important yet not deeply explored question, this paper solves them theoretically and practically with empirical evidences from listed companies in China. First, we explore the questions by dividing ownership property into different types. The results show that private enterprises （PEs） in China, which mainly refer to family - owned or natural person holding enterprises （PrivPs）, are more willing to consistently invest in R＆D activities with high - level expenditures ; state - owned enterprises （ SOEs）, which mainly refer to enterprises controlled by central government and ministries, local governments and their subsidiaries （government -owned enterprises, GOEs）, have low -level R＆D investment. Furthermore, based on ultimate control theory and from the perspectives of type II agency problem and bloekholders counterbalance, we find that although deviation of control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholder has negative impact on corporate innovation, other bloekholders counterbalance in PrivPs boost R＆D investment, that is, blockholders counterbalance in PEs is more efficient than in SOEs. Bloekholders in GOEs are unable to propel corporate innovation and even lower R＆D investment.