中文摘要：

为研究PPP模式下农地整治项目的激励安排,以农业产业化龙头企业与政府间的博弈为例,运用委托代理理论分析政府与企业间的多任务委托代理问题。通过对多任务委托代理模型的求解与分析,讨论最优激励系数的选择及其影响因素,并从风险分担、当前激励策略和长效激励措施等方面给出具体建议。

英文摘要：

In order to study the incentives of farmland consolidation project under PPP model, taking the game between leading enterprise of agricultural industrialization and government as an example, the paper analyzes the multi-task principal-agent problem between the government and the enterprise. Through solving and analyzing the agent model, discusses the choice and influential factors of optimal incentive coefficient, and gives some specific suggestions from the risk sharing, the current incentive strategy and long-term incentives.