本文通过考察2007~2013年国有工业企业和非国有工业企业的分行业统计数据,实证检验了国有企业与非国有企业的资本配置效率是否存在显著差异以及EVA考核能否缩小该差异。研究发现,在控制了其他相关变量后,国有企业的资本配置效率整体上弱于非国有企业;但是,随着EVA考核的实施,两者间的差距逐渐缩小。进一步的检验发现,在竞争程度较高的行业中,EVA考核对缩小两者差异的效果更显著。基于双重差分模型的稳健性检验依旧支持结论。本文为EVA考核经济后果的研究提供了新视角和新证据,也为考核制度的完善提供了有益启示。
This paper studies the economic consequences of EVA evaluation on the capital allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). By empirically examining the difference of capital allocation efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs based on the statistical data of industrial enterprises from 2007 to 2013, we find that the capital allocation efficiency of SOEs is significantly weaker than non-SOEs after controlling other related variables. However, the difference has gradually narrowed with the implementation of EVA. Further, we find that EVA evaluation can significantly reduce the difference of allocation efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs in highly competitive industries. And the robustness test based on DID still supports the conclusion. This paper provides a new perspective and evidence for the research of the economic consequences of EVA, and also provides beneficial enlightenment to better the performance evaluation system of SOEs.