中文摘要：

从世界各国经济发展来看，为了鼓励新能源产业的发展，政府补贴是一种十分普遍的现象。政府补贴在短期内固然是一种可以利用的资源，但过度利用这种资源长期下来会造成隐患，那么完善公司治理机制是否会弱化政府补贴对新能源企业绩效的不利影响呢？笔者基于2007-2013年我国新能源上市公司的面板数据，运用固定效应模型进行实证分析，研究了政府补贴、公司内部治理与新能源企业绩效之间的关系。研究结果发现：从整体上来说新能源企业的政府补贴不利于提高企业绩效，但政府补贴对非国有企业绩效具有正向影响；将公司内部治理作为调节变量，进一步检验发现，股权制衡度和高管薪酬较高，能够有效降低政府补贴对企业绩效的负向影响；而股权集中度和董事会规模较高，则会增强政府补贴对企业绩效的负向影响；监事会持股比例没有调节政府补贴与企业绩效间的关系。在此基础上，笔者针对新能源企业的发展提出了相应的政策建议。

英文摘要：

Government subsidy stays universal in order to encourage the development of new energy industry from the perspective of the economic development of all countries in the world. It＇s true that government subsidy is an available resource. However, the dveruse of it may cause hazards in the long run. In that way, will the improvement of corporate government mechanism weaken the adverse effects of government subsidy on the performance of new energy＇ companies？ With the fixed effects regression model based on the panel data of new energy listed companies from 2007 to 2013, this paper has made an empirical analysis and studied the relationship among government subsidy, the corporate internal governance and the performance of new energy company. The results show that on the whole the government subsidies to the new energy listed companies are not conducive to improve corporate performance while it has a positive impact on the performance of the nonstate-owned listed companies. Further inspection finds that if we take the internal governance as a moderator variable, higher equity balance and executive pay will effectively reduce the negative impact of government subsidy on the corporate performance. And higher ownership concentration and greater scale of the board of directors will increase the negative impact of government subsidy on the corporate performance. Ownership of the board of supervisors fail to adapt the relationship between government subsidy and company performance. According to this, the author here has put forward certain corresponding policy recommendations for the development of new energy corporations.