中文摘要：

事前的信息择时披露和事后对授予日、行权日择时的倒签等高管寻租行为可能导致股权激励失效，但我国的有关文献却非常缺乏，特别是对作为股权激励主要方式之一的股票期权的倒签行为鲜有研究。本文系统回顾了西方研究中的相关文献，分析了股权激励契约的授予日、行权日的择时或倒签行为，在此基础上结合我国股权激励制度及配套的税收制度深入分析了高管在股票期权激励计划披露、行权、出售等关键环节的择时行为的动机及其实现机理。本文对中国上市公司的股权激励方案设计、监管层的股权激励相关配套制度的完善提供了重要的启示，拓宽了股权激励中高管寻租行为的研究视角和内容。

英文摘要：

The option incentive may be failure caused by the managerial rent-seeking be- haviors such as ex ante information timing and ex post backdating, but the disclosure of information selection beforehand and afterwards other executives backdating rent-seeking behavior may result in the option incentive failure, but the literatures on these topic are very lack in China. We systematically review the related western literatures, and analyze the timing and backdating of option grant and exercise as well as its economic consequences. We also do in- depth analysis of the motivation and the realization mechanism for these managerial rent-seeking behaviors within the Chinese mechanism circumstances of equity-based incentive and tax law We hope to provide some reference for the researches and arrangements on equity-based incentive.