中文摘要：

在管理防御假说框架下,从理论上分析了高管变更对资本结构变动的影响,并以2007 ～ 2011年沪深A股上市公司数据进行了实证检验.结果发现：高管变更使继任者面临再次变更的威胁,降低了其管理防御程度,强化了公司的财务杠杆的作用,但这一关系仅在非国有上市公司中存在,在国有上市公司中这一效应可能被高管行政选拔机制和负债软约束等因素所削弱而不显著.进一步分析发现高管变更与资本结构调整的正相关关系仅在负债不足子样本中显著,表明高管变更具有优化公司资本结构决策的功能.

英文摘要：

From the framework of managerial entrenchment, this paper theoretically analyses the influence of managers＇ turnover on capital structure adjustment. Using of the data of listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2011, it empirieally examines the above relation. Empirical results show managers＇ turnover which threatens the successors for turnover again reduces the degree of managerial entrenchment and increases capital structure. However, the relation only exists in non state-owned enterprises, and the effect is weakened by the administrative employment and soft budget constraints in state-owned enterprises. Further evidences suggest the positive relation only exists in the sample of debt deficit, which indicates managers＇ turnover has the function of optimizing the capital structure decision.