中文摘要：

以2003--2012年沪深A股上市公司的平衡面板数据为样本，考虑股权性质的差异，实证检验高管政府背景对公司超额现金持有水平与超额现金持有价值的影响。结果发现，在国有上市公司中，相对于非政府背景高管，政府背景高管所在公司的超额现金持有水平更高，而超额现金持有价值更低，说明高管政府背景扰乱了国有上市公司的现金持有决策，支持政府对公司现金持有决策的“掠夺之手”假说；在非国有上市公司中，相对于非政府背景高管，政府背景高管所在公司的超额现金持有价值更高，一定程度上支持政府对公司现金持有决策的“扶持之手”假说。因此，在不同的制度环境中，政府背景高管持有现金的动机不同，导致其超额现金持有水平也不相同，结果是投资者对超额现金持有的评价也不尽相同。

英文摘要：

This paper empirically exams effect of top managers＇ governmental background on corporate excess cash and value of excess cash utilizing data of China＇s listed fh＇ms from 2003 to 2012 and considering the nature of ownership. Results show that top managers＇ governmental background is significantly positive with excess cash holdings and negative with the value of excess cash holding in the sample of SOEs, which indicates that managers＇ governmental background disturbs cash holding decisions of SOEs and supports the hypothesis of governmental grabbing hands to corporate cash holding decisions. There is significantly posi- tive relationship between top managers＇ governmental background and the value of excess cash holding in the sample of non - SOEs, to some extent, which supports the hypothesis of governmental helping hands to corporate cash holding decisions. These conclusions indicate that different motives of managers with govern- mental background in distinct institutional environment result different levels of excess cash holdings and dif- ferent evaluation of investors to excess cash holdings.