中文摘要：

文章运用系统动力学构建了领导企业和追随企业之间的混合策略演化博弈模型,并仿真分析了不同初始值对保护与剽窃概率的影响,得到了：领导企业是否采取知识产权保护策略与追随企业剽窃的概率大小及保护成本有关;追随企业是否剽窃与领导企业知识产权保护的概率大小及剽窃收益有关;在满足一定的条件下,系统仿真的演化结果具有一定的周期性。

英文摘要：

The paper constructs a mixed strategy evolution game model between leading enterprises and follower enterprisesby applying system dynamics, and simulates and analyzes the impacts of different initial values on the probability of protectionand piracy. The results are as follows： Whether leading enterprises adopt the strategy of intellectual property protection is relat-ed to the piracy probability of follower enterprises and the cost of protection; Whether follower enterprises pirate is related tothe probability of leading enterprises to protect intellectual property rights and piracy income; The evolution results of systemsimulation have a certain periodicity under certain conditions.