中文摘要：

建立了双方无法承诺不再进行协商情况下的契约模型,研究表明：①养殖户和企业对合作剩余差额的均衡份额是双方折现因子、契约事先规定的分配比例的函数。当再协商次数有限时,若双方的提议都被拒绝,事前的讨价还价能力越高者,其均衡份额也就越大,但是当再协商的次数趋于无穷大时,双方的均衡份额均趋于一个常数,此时双方事前的讨价还价能力高低将无法影响双方的均衡份额。②契约再协商可防止双方在信号传递机制中出现的机会主义行为,双方的支付组合位于帕累托效率边界上,但是双方事前的专用投资及养殖户的努力水平却低于最优水平。

英文摘要：

The paper establishes the model for the condition the meatpacking enterprise and the culturist can not exclude contract renegotiation.The conclusions are as following： i） the proportion to share the Cooperate Residuals balance is the function of their discount gene and the proportion stipulated in the contract.When the number of the renegotiation bout is finite and the proposals of the two parties are refused,the stronger the bargain ability,the more share of the Cooperate Residuals balance.And if the number of the renegotiation bout is infinite,the share tend to be constant,which means that the bargain ability have no impact on the share;ii） the renegotiation can hold back the opportunism behaviors in the reveal mechanism,the payment compounding is on Pareto efficiency edge,while the transaction-specific investment and the effort of the culturist is below the prime level.