中文摘要：

20世纪80年代以来,特别是1997年亚洲金融危机之后,传统金融监管理论和实践屡屡受到挑战与质疑。各国学者和政策制定者逐渐认识到,与传统微观审慎监管相比,宏观审慎监管才是防范和化解金融风险的有力工具。在宏观审慎监管政策实践中,首要问题是明确监管主体。目前,尽管中央银行在各国宏观审慎监管实践中的政策地位不尽相同,但均扮演着重要角色,可以概括为决策者、主导者和参与者三种模式,且各具优缺点。本文从宏观审慎监管政策与货币政策协调性视角出发,通过两种政策的辩证关系分析和国际经验借鉴,探讨了中国人民银行以主导者角色参与宏观审慎监管政策制定和执行的可行性及面临的困难。

英文摘要：

Since the 1980 s,especially after Asian financial crisis in 1970,traditional finance supervision theory and practice have been seriously discredited. Scholars and policy-makers around the world have recognized that macro-prudential supervision is a more effective tool to prevent and defuse financial risks compared to the traditional micro-prudential supervision. The key to successful macro-prudential supervision in practice is to decide who should play the leading role in making the supervision. Currently the roles played by the central banks vary from country to country,but they are all very important. Though each has its own strength and weakness,the central banks usually serve as the policy makers,leaders or key participants in macro-prudential supervision. Proceeding from the perspectives of macro-prudential supervision policy and coordinated monetary policy,this paper,based on an analysis of the dialectical relationship between these two kinds of policies and the lessons drawn from the practices of other countries,is intended to examine the feasibility of and possible difficulties in macro-prudential supervision faced by People＇s Bank of China which is expected to play a leading role in making and implementing the macro-prudential supervision policy.