中文摘要：

本文研究混合所有制下企业纵向一体化所产生的竞争及反竞争效应,发现企业的产权结构及市场结构同时对一体化的反竞争效应有着重要影响。使用数值模拟方法,研究显示在上游混合所有制企业实施前向一体化下,只有当参与一体化企业数量较多且混合所有制企业中私有产权比重较大条件下形成的市场圈定才具有反竞争效应;而在下游私有产权企业实施的后向一体化中,市场圈定在一体化企业数量较少且私有产权比重较小,或者在参与一体化企业数量较多的两种情形中出现,且两种类型的市场圈定均具有反竞争效应。这些结果意味着在国有产权占重要地位的经济中,对纵向一体化的反垄断控制标准应与私有产权背景下有较大的不同。

英文摘要：

This paper analyzes the competition and anti-competition effect of vertical integration under mixed ownership.We find that market structure and property rights structure of the firm have important effects on the results of market competition after vertical integration.Using numerical simulation method,the research shows that when the mixed ownership enterprises implement forward integration,only the market foreclosure meeting the following conditions can generate anti-competition effect：the number of integration enterprises is large and the proportion of private property is high.When the enterprises of private property rights implement backward integration,all kinds of market foreclosures generate anti-competition effect.This means in an economy where state-owned property right occupies an important position,the judgment standard on anti-competition effect of vertical integration should be different from private property.