中文摘要：

本文从公司治理的视角出发，以中国上市公司为研究样本探寻了企业现金持有量的经验决定因素。结果表明，在治理规则日渐完善的中国证券市场上，大股东侵蚀中小股东利益而中小股东仍无法有效保护自身利益的问题不容忽视。本文系统完整地回顾了企业现金持有量的经验文献；开辟了从企业决策行为角度来研究公司治理问题的新途径；结合中国证券市场的特有背景，提出了若干有关企业现金持有行为的理论假说，并用平行数据采用固定效应模型技术进行了证实或证伪；对经验分析结果的政策含义进行了相应的理论解释。

英文摘要：

This paper explores by sampling Chinese listed companies the decisive factors in cash-holding amount experience by enterprises from the perspective of corporate governance. The result shows that although regulatory rules on China＇s securities market are being improved, problems that big shareholders infringe on the rights and interests of small shareholders and the latter are unable to protect themselves effectively can be ignored. The paper reviews systemically and completely documents of cash-holding amount experience by enterprises. At the same time, while opening up a new direction to study the issue of corporate governance from the perspective of decision-making behavior of enterprises, the paper puts forward several theoretical hypotheses on cash-holding behavior of enterprises, which are confirmed or falsified by fixed-effect model technology based on parallel data and explains the policy implications of the result from the experience analysis.