中文摘要：

现行会计准则规定，可供出售金融资产公允价值变动损益在其持有和处置时分别计入资产负债表和利润表，使其成为上市公司从事盈余管理行为借用的天然工具。以2007-2010年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究对象，深入分析上市公司可供出售金融资产处置中的盈余管理动机以及各种公司治理机制对盈余管理动机的遏制作用。研究结果表明：（1）上市公司在亏损当年度会利用可供出售金融资产的处置从事扭亏盈余管理行为；亏损当年不能扭亏为盈时，上市公司会延迟处置，待未来年度需要时再处置可供出售金融资产从事大清洗盈余管理行为；（2）不同的公司治理机制对上市公司可供出售金融资产处置中的各种盈余管理行为遏制作用并不一致，大股东持股比例对上市公司利用可供出售金融资产处置中的扭亏和大清洗盈余管理行为具有显著的遏制作用，但其他的公司治理机制对于遏制上市公司扭亏和大清洗盈余管理行为的效果并不理想。

英文摘要：

The current accounting standards stipulate that the changes in fair value recognised in profits or losses of the financial assets available for sale should be written into the statement of assets and liabilities or the profit statement respectively when the companies are holding or disposing it, making it a borrowed natural instrument for the listed companies to be engaged in earnings management behavior. Taking China＇s A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2010 as the research objects, this study conducts a deep analysis of the earnings management motivation of the listed companies in disposing the financial assets available for sale and the constraining function of various corporate governance mechanisms on the earnings management motivations. The results of the study indicate that： （1） the listed companies will make use of the disposal of financial assets available for sale to turn loss into profit in their current profit-lossing year; and if they cannot turn loss into profit in their current profit-lossing year, the listed companies will delay the disposal until the future year when required, then they will be engaged in the great purge of earnings management behavior of disposing the financial assets available for sale; （2） different corporate governance mechanisms of the listed companies can play different constraining role in various earnings management behav- iors during the disposal of financial assets available for sale, the stock proportion of the major stockholders can play a significant constraining role in the behaviors of turning loss into profit and the great purge of earnings management during the disposal of financial assets available for sale by the listed companies; but other corporate governance mechanisms cannot achieve the desired effect in constraining the behaviors of turning loss into profit and taking a great purge of earnings management by the listed companies.