中文摘要：

分析师跟进能够有效缓解上市公司和信息使用者之间存在的信息不对称程度,发挥信息中介的作用。本文从“信息中介——审计风险——审计费用”这一链条研究了分析师跟进与审计费用之间的关系。研究结果发现,分析师跟进与审计费用显著负相关,明星分析师跟进更有利于降低审计费用。进一步研究发现,分析师跟进与审计费用之间的负相关关系取决于会计师事务所依赖分析师研究报告的程度,对于信息自给能力较强的会计师事务所而言,其依赖分析师研究报告的程度较低,分析师跟进与审计费用的负相关关系程度较低。

英文摘要：

Financial analysts following can reduce information asymmetry between listed companies and information users as information intermediaries. This paper studied the relationship between financial analysts following and audit fee from the chain of ＂information intermediaries - audit risk - audit fee＂. The results showed that financial analysts following is significantly negative with audit fees, and star analysts following will severely impact this relationship. We further found that the relationship between financial analysts following and audit fee depends on the extent that audit firm and auditors rely on the information provided by financial analysts. The marginal benefit that analyst following helps mitigate agency problem would be less valued by self- sufficient auditors. The effect that analyst following reduces audit fee would be less pronounced for such auditors.