中文摘要：

近年来,欧美等发达国家通过TRIPS-plus条款要求与其签订自由贸易协议的发展中国家禁止平行进口,以加强知识产权保护.为使发展中国家有效应对TRIPS-plus条款,本文通过构建多阶段博弈模型,在Acharyya等（[1-2]】的基础上将企业创新能力视为内生变量,分别从发达国家与发展中国家的角度分析TRIPS-plus条款实施前后两国福利水平,阐述实施该条款对两国的影响;进而研究两国国内以及两国之间有关平行进口和价格补贴政策协调,论证价格补贴在应对TRIPSplus条款中的作用.研究表明,在TRIPS-plus条款下,发达国家与发展中国家政策选择取决于两国收入分配情况,且发展中国家可通过价格补贴改善或维持本国社会福利;若取消TRIPS-plus条款,则发达国家禁止本国平行进口,两国均提供价格补贴将实现共赢.同时,本文发现平行进口政策选择及价格补贴比例是影响企业创新能力的重要因素.

英文摘要：

In recent years,Europe,North America and other developed countries which signed free trade agreement through the TRIPS-plus treaty have been prohibiting parallel imports to strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights.In order to help developing countries to effectively deal with the terms of the TRIPS-plus,this paper constructs a multi-stage game model and makes enterprise’s innovation ability as an endogenous variable based on the Acharyya[1-2],to analyze the benefit level from developed and developing countries before and after the application of TRIPS-plus,in order to prove the impact of TRIPS-plus on both countries;then to analyze the parallel import and price subsidy policy coordination within and between the two countries,thus to make conclusion on the effect of price subsidy in the process of applying TRIPS-plus.The research result shows that,under TRIPS-plus,the policy choices of developed and developing countries are based on the income level of the countries,and the developing countries can improve or keep its own social benefit by using price subsidy;if the TRIPS-plus is cancelled,developed countries will prohibit the parallel import,making the win-win result of the two countries by both using price subsidy.At the same time,this paper has also found parallel import and price subsidy ratio are important factors of innovation ability.