中文摘要：

以2008--2011期间A股市场非国有企业为研究对象，借鉴了系统论的思维模式构建分析框架，研究了不同代理风险情况下，现金股利预案公告非预期市场反应的差异。实证分析结果表明：最终控制人的掏空能力越强、受到的掏空激励越大、面临的掏空机会越好，现金股利预案公告的非预期市场反应越大；而相关的监督机制越完善，现金股利预案公告的非预期市场反应越小。最后，在深化对股利代理成本相关问题认识的同时，也为A股市场“分红新政”提供了经验参考。

英文摘要：

With the A-share non-state-owned listed companies during the years from 2008 to 2011 as research samples, based on the thinking model of Systematic Theory to construct the analytical framework, this study is made on the difference be- tween cash dividend plan announcement and unexpected market reaction in the circumstances of different agency risks. The em- pirical results show that the stronger the tunneling ability of final controller, the more the incentive to tunneling, the better the tunneling opportunity, the bigger the unexpected market reaction to cash dividend plan announcement. However, the more perfect the supervision mechanism, the smaller the unexpected market reaction to cash dividend plan announcement. This paper gives a deepening understanding on dividend agency cost and provides a good reference for ＂New Policy on Dividends＂ of A-share mar- ket.