中文摘要：

集体违约风险是导致农户联保贷款失败的一个重要原因,它主要由组员合谋与经营环境恶化两种情形引起.为有效防控联保小组集体违约风险,试图引入抵押品形成农户联保抵押贷款创新模式,并借助相关数据和博弈工具分析了其运行机制,结果显示：近年来我国农户抵押担保能力不断提高,使得该创新贷款模式具有一定的现实可行性;联保小组合谋时的投资项目平均成功概率与其抵押品变现价值正相关,即抵押品除了可以作为银行贷款损失的重要补偿手段外,还可在一定程度上抑制联保小组合谋进行高风险投资.据此,基于联保小组集体违约风险的防控思想,建议村镇银行试行农户联保抵押贷款模式,同时也提出如建立风险分担机制、推行交叉联保等其他可操作性建议.

英文摘要：

Group default risk is an important reason for the failure of farmers＇ group lending,and it can be caused by collusion among group members or deterioration of business environment. To effectively prevent and control the group default risk,this paper attempts to introduce the collaterals into group lending to make a new lending model, and has analyzed its operation mechanism with the help of relevant data and game theory. It is found that the increasing collateral of farmers in our country has made this new lending model practical. Moreover, the average success probability of group＇s investment projects is positively related to the cash realizable value of collaterals when members conspire with each other, which means that collaterals can prevent members from colluding with each other to make high-risk investments to some extent in addition to being an important means of loss compensation in the loan for the bank. Therefore,village banks are advised to try out the innovative model of farmers＇ group lending with collaterals to prevent the group default risk effectively. Furthermore, the paper puts forward some other practical suggestions, such as establishing risk-sharing mechanism and carrying out group lending with members in different agricultural production activities.