本文基于国内某银行消费贷款业务数据,实证研究了信息不对称条件下抵押物对商业银行消费贷款经营行为的影响。结果表明:(1)抵押物能够显著影响商业银行消费贷款配给行为,提供抵押物的借款人获得的借款额度明显较高,且抵押物配给效果受信息不对称程度影响明显;(2)抵押物与消费贷款违约风险呈现显著的负相关关系,抵押物作用机制中的“客户选择”效应占主导地位;(3)抵押物决定与借款人事前风险评估无明显关联,但与借款人抵押物可获得性高度相关,表明银行业务经营中存在一定程度的抵押物依赖现象。
Using the micro loan data from a commercial bank of China, this paper examines the impact of collateral on consumer credit management behavior under the condition of asymmetric information. The empirical results show that: (1) Collateral does influence the consumer credit rationing behavior, the borrowers pledged collateral obviously obtain more loans, and the rationing effect of collateral is affected seriously by the extent of asymmetric information. (2) Collateral is negatively related to the loan default risk, indicating the " screening device" role of collateral is dominated. (3) The pledge of collateral is not necessarily related to the ex ante risk assessment of the borrower by the bank, but is truly related to the collateral availability of the borrower, also indicating a collateral dependence phenomenon in the consumer credit management behavior.