本文分析了战略性新兴产业技术创新联盟在基础研究与应用开发两个阶段的投入博弈过程。研究表明:核心企业在多阶段博弈中倾向于增加应用开发阶段的投入,减少基础研究阶段的补贴比例。核心企业在应用开发阶段的投入越多,对基础研究阶段的补贴比例越高,代理组织对基础阶段的投入越多。
This paper analyzes Strategic Emerging Industrial Technology Innovation Alliance's investment game process of basic research and application development stage. This research indicates that the core enterprise tends to increase the input of the application development and reduce the proportion of subsidies for basic research stage in the multi - stage game. The more the input of the core enterprise, the higher proportion of subsidies for basic research stage, the more the agency organization invests in the application development stage.