中文摘要：

立足于企业转型升级和跨越式发展的战略诉求,并购成为企业实现迅速扩张和优化资源配置的重要工具。本文选取2009—2014年发生并购重组事件的A股上市公司作为研究对象,以并购交易绩效、并购整合绩效和并购可持续增长绩效多重指标为研究侧重点,结合我国特有的产权制度背景,考察内部控制有效性、高管代理成本对多重并购绩效的影响。研究发现,高质量的内部控制能够有效改善多重并购绩效,高管代理成本会抑制并购后主并公司的多重并购绩效;同时,内部控制能减弱代理成本对并购绩效的损害程度,但这一治理作用在国有企业与非国有企业中表现各异。研究结论为我国进一步加强包括内部控制和公司治理机制在内的制度建设提供决策依据。

英文摘要：

Due to the strategic demand for＂transformation and upgrading＂and＂great-leap-forward development＂,mergers and acquisitions（ MA） has become an important tool for an enterprise to achieve the rapid expansion and optimize the allocation of resources. Based on the MA events of A-share listed companies during the years from 2009 to 2014,with the research focus on multiple indicators such as MA transaction performance,MA integration performance and MA sustainable growth performance,combined with China＇s unique property system background,this paper studies the impact of internal control effectiveness and top manager agency cost upon multiple performance of MA. The study finds that high-quality internal control can effectively improve the multiple performance of MA and that top manager agency cost would inhibit the MA performance of acquiring company. At the same time,internal control can weaken the degree of damage on MA performance by agency cost,but such governance role varies in the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. The research conclusion provides a foundation for decision-making in China to further strengthen the institutional construction including internal control and corporate governance mechanism.