中文摘要：

文章基于中国资本准入管制、政府控制的制度背景,从控制权转移过程中的收购方选择、转让定价、转让后绩效等方面,研究了中国上市公司控制权转移的动机。文章以中国A股市场上截至2013年末的1 410起公司控制权转移事件为样本,研究发现：（1）政府倾向于转让非垄断行业或业绩较差的国有上市公司,而保留垄断行业和业绩较好的公司;（2）在经济落后地区,政府倾向于将控制权转让给有实力的外地收购方,以达到招商引资的目的;（3）有政治关系的民营收购方收购了盈利能力较好的公司,但没有支付较高的溢价;（4）控制权转移后,公司绩效总体上没有提高,虽然同业并购、实力较强的收购方能够提高公司绩效,但这类样本不到40%。因此,中国上市公司控制权转移总体上不是效率导向的,如果控制权转移不是从效率出发的,则控制权市场约束在位管理层、降低代理成本等作用就难以发挥。

英文摘要：

From the perspectives of listing regulation and government control, this pa- per describes the motivation of controlling rights transfer in Chinese listed companies in aspects of acquirer selection, transfer pricing, performance after the transfer and so on in the process of controlling rights transfer. Using 1410 controlling rights transfer events in China＇s A-share market by the end of 2013 as the sample, it arrives at the conclusions as follows. firstly, governments tend to transfer state-owned listed companies in non-monopoly industries or with poor performance and retain the companies in monopoly industries and with sound performance; secondly, in economically backward areas, governments are prone to transfer controlling rights to powerful nonnative acquirers to attract investment; thirdly, private acquirers with political connections acquire companies with better profit- ability, but do not pay higher premiums; fourthly, after controlling rights transfer, cor- porate performance does not raise as a whole, and although correlative M~A and stronger strength of acquirers lead to the increase in corporate performance, such samples are less than 40%. Therefore, controlling rights transfer in Chinese listed companies is not overall efficiency-oriented, and if controlling rights transfer is not based on efficiency, it will be difficult to play the role of controlling rights market in the restrictions on the management in position, the decrease in agency costs and so on.