中文摘要：

在营销渠道的管理中，企业通常会通过设计一系列契约条件对中间商进行监督和激励，整个过程很少考虑来自市场第三方——消费者的信息反馈。本文指出和分析了消费者信息在三方经济关系中的作用。通过企业、消费者和中间商的定量模型，分析了消费者信息对企业激励与监督营销渠道中间商行为的影响；以及提高营销渠道的效率影响因素和条件；得出结论：当消费者偏好和企业偏好不一致时，过多的消费者反馈信息会降低渠道管理效率。

英文摘要：

In channel management, enterprises usually design a set of contracts to monitor and stimulate dealers, consequently, the channel management focused on research the relationship between enterprise and dealer or dealer and costumer or enterprise and consumer. Consumer complaint and information feedback from consumers as the third party in the market activity are only considered indirectly in the whole channel management. But the consumer complaint and consumer information feedback are taken an important role in modern marketing channel management. This paper was put forward and analyzed the direct impact of consumer information among triadic economic relationship. By establishing a management model involved in enterprise utility, consumers information, and dealers＇stimulation based on game theory and channel relationship management, it analyzed the influence of consumer information on enterprises＇stimulation and monitoring of dealer behavior and factors contributing to improvement of the efficiency of marketing channels. The results were explained by a firm case, sampling 6609 covered 14 city consumers in china. The findings suggest that： when consumer preference is not consistent with enterprise preference, it does not ensure that consumer complaint or consumer information feedback facilitates the improvement of channel management performance and consumer benefit.